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THREE (POTENTIAL) PILLARS OF TRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC JUSTICE:
THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS AS GUARANTORS OF
GLOBAL EQUAL TREATMENT AND MARKET COMPLETION
ROBERT HOCKETT

Abstract: This essay aims to bring two important lines of inquiry and criticism
together. It ﬁrst lays out an institutionally enriched account of what a just world
economic order will look like. That account prescribes, via the requisites to that
mechanism which most directly instantiates the account, ‘‘three realms of equal
treatment and market completion’’Fthe global products, services, and labor
markets; the global investment/ﬁnancial markets; and the global preparticipation
opportunity allocation. The essay then suggests how, with minimal if any
departure from familiar canons of traditional international legal mandate interpretation, each of the Bretton Woods institutionsFparticularly the GATT/WTO
and the IMFFcan be viewed at least in part as charged with the task of fostering
equal treatment and ultimate market completion within one of those three realms.
The piece then argues that one of the institutions in particularFthe World
BankFhas, for reasons of at best negligent and at worst willful injustice on the
part of inﬂuential state actors in the world community, fallen farthest short in
pursuit of what should be viewed as its proper mandate. The article accordingly
concludes that a fuller empowerment of the Bank to effect its ideal mission will
press the Bretton Woods system more nearly into ethical balance, and with it the
world into justice; and that full empowerment of the GATT/WTO and IMF
should be partly conditioned upon the fuller empowerment of the Bank.
Keywords: justice, global justice, justice theory, global economy, international economics, global ﬁnance, global trade, Bretton Woods, IMF, World Bank, WTO.

1. Introduction
1.1. The justice of the global economic order has received a healthy dose
of renewed philosophic attention of late (e.g., Pogge 2002; Shue 1996;
Steiner 1994, 1999; Unger 1996).1 Replace the word philosophic with
1
I would like to thank Dick Arneson, Jack Barceló, Christian Barry, Jerry Cohen, Jerry
Mashaw, Richard Miller, Herbert Morais, John Roemer, Bob Shiller, and David Wippman
for helpful conversation on the subjects of this essay.
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critical, and the same may be said of three institutions widely viewed as
lynchpins of that orderFthe International Monetary Fund (IMF, or ‘‘the
Fund’’), the World Bank (IBRD, or ‘‘the Bank’’), and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/
WTO)Fwhich, taking minimal license, I shall call collectively ‘‘the
Bretton Woods Institutions’’ (e.g., Blustein 2001; Cauﬁeld 1996; Dunkley
2000; Stiglitz 2002).2
The recently renewed attention paid to global justice, however, has not
as yet been notably rich in focus upon the constitutive roles originally
envisaged for, or currently played by, the aforementioned institutions, or
upon how those institutions act, or are designed to act, in concert. Nor
has the widespread, and surely warranted, public controversy generated
by the Bretton Woods institutions featured much in the way of any
systematically articulated point of view from which to judge their
performances.
I wish, therefore, in this contribution to bring two important lines of
inquiry and criticism togetherFa task that now would seem to be both
possible and pressing. For it is striking that on both a compelling,
institutionally informed conception of global justice and a plausible
reading of the mandates of each of the Bretton Woods institutions, the
three organizations together can be viewed, at least in potential, as a kind
of ‘‘three-legged stool’’ upon which might rest a just global economic
order. As the simile suggests, however, each leg must be adequately
constructed before the founding might be considered secure. And each
must bear its proper portion of the weight borne by the whole.
1.2. In what follows, then, I ﬁrst lay out what I take to be a compelling
sketch of what a just world economic order will look like. That account
prescribes what I shall label ‘‘three realms of equal treatment and market
completion’’Fnamely, the global products, services, and labor markets;
the global investment/ﬁnancial markets; and the global preparticipation
opportunity allocation. I then note how, with minimal if indeed any
2
‘‘License’’ because (a) the Bretton Woods conference actually brought us only the IMF
and IBRD and (b) the WTO did not come into being until 1994. ‘‘Minimal’’ because, on the
other hand, (a) the Bretton Woods framers explicitly viewed the ﬁnancial institutions that
they conceived as essential complements to the GATT (see, e.g., James 1996) and (b) the
WTO, brought into being in 1994, in essence took on the role originally envisaged for an
‘‘International Trade Organization’’ (ITO) ﬁfty years earlier (idem). It should also be noted
here that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) is but one of
a small cluster of institutions collectively known as the ‘‘World Bank Group.’’ I use the word
Bank to refer to the collectivity rather than to the IBRD alone and use ‘‘IBRD’’ to refer
speciﬁcally to one member of that collectivity.
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departure from familiar canons of traditional international legal mandate
interpretation, each of the Bretton Woods institutions can be viewed at
least in part as charged with the task of fostering or guaranteeing equal
treatment and market completion within one of those three realms.
Thence I suggest that one of the Bretton Woods institutions in particularFthe BankFhas, for reasons of negligent, reckless, or willful injustice
on the part of inﬂuential state actors in the world community (not on the
part of its staff ), fallen farthest short in pursuit of its ideal mandate. And
I suggest, only somewhat more tentatively, that many anxieties over the
operations of the other two institutionsFthe GATT/WTO and the
FundFactually stem from dysfunctions visited upon the system as a
whole by the Bank’s falling short. I conclude accordingly that a fuller
empowerment of the Bank to effect its mission will press the full system
more nearly into balanceFkicking the stool to its feet, so to speakFand
thereby the world into justice. Short of that fuller empowerment, I
suggest, the continued conferral of powers upon the other two Bretton
Woods institutions should be conditioned upon those powers’ likelihood
of yielding or conducing to some ‘‘second best’’ that is substantially more
just than the status quo.
2. Justice in Theory, Metatheory, and Mechanism
2.1. I shall not here argue exhaustively for one, detailed conception of
global justice (see Hockett 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). Nor shall I survey all
candidates currently on offer or anticipate and address every objection
that might be, or has been, raised to sundry components of the summary
account that I shall set forth here (idem). I shall instead offer what I
believe nearly anyone will recognize to be a presumptively persuasive
conception. This conception bears critical resemblances to several quite
inﬂuential accounts of justice (e.g., Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989; Dworkin
2000; Roemer 1998; Sen 1993), the realization of any of which would be
preferable to the state in which we ﬁnd the world at present.
2.2. Justice is concerned with appropriate distributions of beneﬁt and
burden over individuals.3 That raises at least three constitutive concerns,
as well as a trio of critical collateral concerns, that must occupy any
3
One could take the variable ‘‘individuals’’ to range over any number of sorts of
entityFhuman persons, sentient beings, families, cities, ‘‘peoples’’ (linguistically or culturally identiﬁed groups), nation-states, and so on. I believe that any such selection that does
not ultimately reduce consistently to justice over persons would be objectionably fetishistic,
but I cannot argue for that proposition here. Please see Hockett 2004a and Hockett 2004b.
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complete theory of justice. Constitutively, we must give an account of
what shall count for purposes of justice as relevant beneﬁts or burdens.
We must also give an account of the individuals whose beneﬁts and
burdens will concern justice. And we must say something about how we
are to determine the propriety of the distribution. Collaterally, the fact
that (a) we are concerned with distributions over plural individuals
and that (b) plural beneﬁts and burdens might be of various kinds
requires that we also take account of three measurement concerns either
in our constitutive account of justice, in our considerations of our justice
account’s practical instantiability, or both. Speciﬁcally, we must concern
ourselves with measurement in an absolute, quantiﬁcational sense (‘‘how
much,’’ simpliciter, ‘‘of beneﬁt/burden B’’); in an interpersonal comparability-in-the-holding sense (‘‘how much B held by person P1, in comparison to how much held by person P2’’); and in what, for reasons that will
become clear in a moment, we might call an ‘‘interdistribuendanal’’
commensurability sense (‘‘how much ‘total beneﬁt/burden’ in case of
this much B1, that much B2, and so on’’).
I call the relevant beneﬁt/burden question the question of the proper
distribuendum (plural, -enda). That of the proper characterization of
justice’s beneﬁciaries I call the question of the distribuees. And the
question of a distribution’s propriety I call the question of the appropriate
distribution rule, or formula. I call the collateral measurement questions
the quantiﬁcational, interpersonal comparability, and commensurability
questions.4
2.3. The most plausible account of distribuees is that which construes
them as boundedly responsible agents, capable of effecting or affecting
their own well-being while constrained in so doing by features of the
environments into which they are born. Their capacitiesFthemselves
features of those environmentsFonly permit them limited latitude in
altering or exiting from the same. To view a person as a responsible
agent is to view her as, at least in part, self-regulating per a disposition to
value outcomes and to choose from among alternative courses of action,
as well as per a capacity to recognize and respect this same autonomy in
others.
4
I have argued elsewhere (Hockett 2004a) that we must answer each justice-constitutive
and collateral question with a view to the others. Here I simply sketch that account of justice
which it seems to me ﬂows most ‘‘directly’’Fisomorphically, so to speakFfrom the most
intuitively plausible ﬁllings-in of each of the aforementioned variables. A further advantage
of my ﬁllings-in, I believeFbeyond their seeming more intuitively ‘‘direct’’ in their variable
ﬁllingFis that they readily suggest a simple institutional embodiment.
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This view of distribuees suggests a view of justice-relevant distribuenda
as anything which, consistent with respect for others’ autonomy as just
noted, distribuees themselves value or disvalue, anything which they
would wish to obtain or attain or avoid.5 If ‘‘beneﬁts’’ are good and
‘‘burdens’’ ill, and if distribuees are environment-responsive, responsible
agents whose autonomy in forming conceptions of the good and the ill is
to be respected, then the distribuenda that are of concern to justice will be
more or less whatever distributable items are of concern to justice’s
beneﬁciariesFits distribuees.6
These conceptions of distribuees and distribuenda appear to recommend the following formulation of the appropriate distribution rule,
sometimes styled the ‘‘luck-egalitarian,’’ but what I shall call the ‘‘endowment-egalitarian,’’ principle: Allow distribuees’ holdings of distribuenda or quantities thereof the holding of which tends to vary
foreseeably in response to their responsible actions or attitudes to vary
with those responsible actions or attitudes; and equalize holdings of all
other distribuenda or quantities thereof. I call that ﬁrst component of
anyone’s holdings the ‘‘ethically endogenous’’ component. It is that
component for the holding of which the distribuee, conceived as a
responsible agent, is appropriately held ethically accountable.
I call the second component of the agent’s holdings the ‘‘ethically
exogenous’’ component, or the ‘‘residuum.’’ It is, as it were by deﬁnition,
that portion for which she is not responsibleFthat portion over the
holding of which there is good reason to suppose she bore no choice.
2.4. These characterizations of the distribuee, distribuendum, and distribution formula variables operate in conjunction with both conceptual
and operational measurement constraints in a number of complex and
practically critical ways.
First, the matter of simple quantiﬁability has stood in the way of
settlement upon mutually agreeable distribuenda and distribution formulae in the following way: On the one hand, luck, resource, opportunity,
access, goods, and beneﬁts are not intelligible as suchFand thus are not
appreciable as ethically signiﬁcantFapart from some person’s (actual or
idealized) preference for or valuation of these items, hence, apart from
5
I trust that I need not tarry here over endogenous, ‘‘external’’ or otherwise objectionable preferences, about which of course any liberal theory of justice must ultimately speak.
See, e.g., Stigler and Becker 1977; Dworkin 1977, 234f.; Sen 1979. The matter is too complex
to dispose in this brief account, but I do not in passing over it intend to be taken for
dismissing it.
6
Again, with the caveat mentioned in the previous footnote.
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their yielding some manner of ‘‘satisfaction,’’ ‘‘value,’’ ‘‘happiness,’’
‘‘utility,’’ ‘‘welfare,’’ or ‘‘well-being,’’ conceived in some suitable manner.
On the other hand, these latter statesFwelfare, ‘‘utility,’’ and so
forthFdo not lend themselves to cardinal measurement. Relatedly,
they cannot be directly distributed to anyone. They are experienced
only as ‘‘outputs’’ of utility functions the inputs to which must be some
objective item or items, rather than some subjective state or states. And
while these objective inputs are, by and large, cardinally quantiﬁable, so
long as the outputs that render them ethically signiﬁcant are not it is
difﬁcult to determine how much of any of them anyone ethically ought to
have.
What is more, bounded agents are in part responsible for, and in part not
responsible for, their own utility functions. One can be innately more
difﬁcult to satisfy than others, and one can in a manner choose to be more
difﬁcultFor expensiveFto satisfy than others (see Arrow 1973; Dworkin
2000). And the difﬁculty of cardinally measuring happiness intractably
afﬂicts the already difﬁcult task of separately tracing the ethically
endogenous (responsible) and the ethically exogenous (nonresponsible)
grounds of one’s utility functionFof one’s translating objective inputs
into subjective outputs.
Second, even were welfare cardinally measurable as a state of any given
person, it is unclear whether it would be interpersonally comparable as a
state type enjoyed among multiple persons. For there can appear to be,
intuitively, something radically distinct as between P1’s happiness and
P2’s happiness, presumably owing in some manner to there seeming to be
something radically unique about every sentient being’s subjectivity, or
consciousness, itself (see, e.g., Chalmers 1998; Nagel 1999, 1991).
Third, the fact that there are multiple inputsFbeneﬁts and burdensFthat appear differentially to affect utility and disutility, coupled
with the difﬁculty attending cardinally measuring the utility and disutility
afforded by such beneﬁts and burdens, would render it difﬁcult, even were
interpersonal comparability somehow unproblematic, to determine how
much of beneﬁt B1 would compensate P1 for a shortage of, say, B2 relative
to person P2. Unless the appropriate distribution formula were to
mandate a distinct distribution of each good and ill over all distribuees
independent of the distribution of the other goods and illsFa seemingly
implausible suggestionFwe require ‘‘rates of exchange’’ between goods
and ills themselves in order to derive a numéraire or index suitable to
determining how much ‘‘good-or-ill-stuff in total’’ any distribuee holds.
But since utility is the touchstone of some objective item’s beneﬁcial or
burdensome status to an agent, and since said utility is problematic in the
r Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005
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measurement, it is not clear how we are to commensurate disparate
beneﬁts and burdens in a manner pertinent to justice. Our would-be
numéraire is itself cardinally nonquantiﬁable.
2.5. Happily, there appears to be one mechanism, readily constructible
in theory and seemingly approximable in practice, by which we might
simultaneously circumvent all three measurement problems, while doing
justice to the three values assigned the constitutive justice-theoretic
variables (responsible agents, all beneﬁts and burdens adjudged such by
such agents, endowment-egalitarian distribution). The same mechanism
enables us to address, at least in part, the problem posed by bounded
agents’ being responsible in part, while not in whole, for their own utility
functions. To the degree that we can practically realize this mechanism,
then, we can simultaneously render the world more practically just and
resolve, or unobjectionably sidestep, the principal measure-theoretic
problems.
Here, in schematic form, is the mechanism: Assume a ‘‘complete’’
marketFa forum in which all and only desired voluntary trading
occursFin (a) all goods and services that can practically be made
available and that anyone values (hence, that are cognizable in justice
as ethically relevant distribuenda), and (b) contingent claims to compensation upon the occurrence of any eventuality that anyone disvalues,
payable by anyone willing to take the opposite sides of these (what
amount to) ‘‘bets,’’ on the disvalued contingencies. Assume further that
this market is ‘‘neutral’’ in the following sense: First, each participant
enters it with an initial endowment of (in the nature of property rights to)
desired assets equal to that with which everyone else enters it. And,
second, regulatory norms effectively prevent such collusively, strategically, or expropriatively opportunistic behaviors as would effectively
result in some participants’ coming to possess greater or lesser holdings
or ‘‘price-affecting effective demand powers’’ than would be traceable to
their initial (ethically exogenous) endowments and independent (ethically
endogenous) transaction histories alone.7 This mechanism, I claim,
straightforwardly instantiates the justice account sketched above.
2.6. Before turning to the ultimate realizability of the mechanism in its
entirety or the question of a ‘‘second best’’ absent full realizability, let us
note, ﬁrst, how it satisﬁes the prescriptions entailed by the three above7
I shall here set aside the question of the means by which endowment equalization would
be effected, and the ‘‘problem of future generations.’’
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offered ﬁllings-in of the constitutive justice variables. Let us also note,
second, how it addresses the critical measurement concerns. And let us
note, third, how its realization both would seem to require and would
seem to be straightforwardly brought about by equal treatment and
market completion in the three Bretton Woods–associated realms noted
at the very outset of this article.
2.6.1. The mechanism straightforwardly honors distribuees as responsible agents, who transact voluntarily pursuant to their own, autonomous
relative valuations of items and contingencies that they prefer and
disprefer. The mechanism straightforwardly treats as distribuenda whatever goods and ills the distribuees themselves value or disvalueFwhatever goods and ills they seek to obtain, attain or avoid, from which goods
and ills their ‘‘utilities’’ derive. And the mechanism, via the neutrality
imposed upon it at the outset and retained throughout, equalizes all that
is ethically exogenousFall that is not traceable in the holding directly to
a choiceFwhile allowing holdings over time nonetheless to vary with
ethically endogenous transactional decisions. All holdings at time Tn, that
is to say, are traceable to equalized holdings at T0 and voluntary choices.
2.6.2. The mechanism sidesteps, in an ethically satisfactory way, the
problem of cardinal utility measurement by allowing distribuees, via their
voluntary trading activity, presumptivelyFby dint of the ‘‘ﬁrst fundamental theorem of welfare economics’’ (see, e.g., Arrow 1951)Fto
‘‘maximize’’ utility. And that maximization occurs in a manner that is
consistent with (a) ethically exogenous endowment equality among all
market participants, and (b) consequently equally shared scarcity of the
resources from which distribuees ‘‘produce’’ their own utility. (In the
jargon, the mechanism fosters regular tâttonement toward Equal Division
Walrasian Equilibria, which, it is well established, are fair, envy free, and
Pareto efﬁcient (see Baumol 1986; Foley 1967; Hockett 2004a, 2004b,
2004c; Kolm 1972; Pazner and Schmeidler 1974; Varian 1974; Walras
1954). It doesn’t matter for justice purposes, that is to say, what sort of
numberFcardinal or ordinalFthat we might assign to distribuees’
utilities, or how we manage to scale such numbers, so long as we know
that the utilities are the ‘‘highest’’ possible consistent with the correct
distribution rule and the (consequently equally shouldered) constraints
posed by the environment.
Similarly, the mechanismFagain unobjectionablyFsidesteps the problem of interpersonal utility comparison. For we have stipulated that the
resource ‘‘inputs’’ (that is, the ethically exogenous inputs, sometimes
r Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005
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called ‘‘internal resources,’’ e.g., Dworkin 2000) that go into ‘‘utility
production’’ are themselves countedFin the form of drugs, supplements,
or contingent claims to compensationFamong the exogenous endowments that must be equalized over participants. And in such cases
whatever the absolute or comparative ‘‘quanta’’ of ‘‘utility’’ enjoyed by
distribuees, we shall know that these are the ‘‘highest’’ that they can be
consistent with the appropriate distribution rule and the consequently
equally shouldered constraints posed by the resource environment.
Finally, the mechanism ‘‘automatically,’’ as it were, commensurates
distribuenda in the only way that ethically matters, via the autonomous
implicit comparative valuations of autonomously transacting distribuees
(see Hockett 2004a; Hockett and Risse 2004.) We need not worry
ourselves over how much of B2 ‘‘would’’ or will compensate P1 for a
deﬁcit of B1, let alone construct a ‘‘perfectionist’’ index of all goods and
ills (on which see Arneson 1990; idem). Our distribuees themselves will, in
effect, autonomously and with equal voice construct the relevant indexFa spontaneously emergent price index. That index amounts to an
aggregated comparative ‘‘social’’ valuation of goods and ills, in the
construction of which each participant has had an equal ‘‘vote’’ (idem).
(Again, provided that there exist market completeness and neutrality in
the senses explicated above.) And so yet again, in a manner that reﬂects
the constraints both of relative environmental scarcities and of the
appropriate distribution rule, we ﬁnd the mechanism allowing the
measurement question to ‘‘take care of itself’’ to precisely the degree
that justice itself demands care be taken at all.
2.6.3. Now recall that the two critical provisos to the mechanism’s being
capable of affording full justice were that the envisaged market be
‘‘complete’’ and ‘‘neutral.’’ ‘‘Completeness’’ means, roughly, that all
goods and ills that should count as ethically signiﬁcant for justice
purposesFnamely, all items and contingencies that justice’s distribuees
themselves can acquire, provide or produce and that they value or
disvalueFcan be transferred from relatively less desiring holders to
more desiring nonholders via voluntary transaction on that idealized
market.8 Familiar goods and services markets in ‘‘advanced’’ and even
many barter economies are largelyFor at any rate potentiallyFcomplete
in this sense, at least within their jurisdictional walls. But gross disparities
in ethically exogenous endowments, as well as certain artiﬁcial barriers
8
This is my justice-theoretic modiﬁcation of a concept more familiar to welfare and
ﬁnancial economists. See, e.g., Allais 1953; Arrow 1953; generally Magill and Quinzii 1996.
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found between jurisdictionally separated markets, tend to diminish the
fuller completeness that those markets would enjoy were they both
endowment egalitarian and unsegmented.
What is less immediately obvious is how very incomplete the ‘‘ills
markets’’Fthat is, the contingent-claims marketsFcurrently remain. We
are only just beginning to appreciateFand take measures in light ofF
how much more in the way of risk could, even with current (largely new)
technologies, be traded than currently are traded (see, e.g., Hockett
2004c; Shiller 2003; 1993; Allen and Gale 1994).9 This is particularly so
as we begin to remove barriers that segment the ﬁnancial markets, in
effect bringing changes that are greatly enriching the variety of risks that
can be traded from less to more desiring bearers worldwide. Turning from
completeness to neutrality, ‘‘neutrality’’ means, roughly, that each
participant in the ‘‘complete’’ market should ‘‘count’’ for one and only
one identically social-valuationally empowered, comparatively goodsand ills-valuing agent. Participants, that is to say, must enter and leave
the market, no matter what the time, with holdings traceable only to
equal exogenous endowments and whatever endogenous decisions they
have made (such as gratuitously to transfer, trade, expend labor, waste,
and so on). This is not only a straightforward requirement of the justice
conception; it also, as suggested above, would appear to be required by
the mechanism-requisite of ‘‘completeness’’ itself.
9
An example or two might be helpful here: Financial derivatives, as has been widely
observed, in recent decades have enabled relatively wealthy market participantsFin
particular, large ﬁnancial institutionsFto trade formerly untradable risks and thereby
improve the aggregate efﬁciency of risk-bearing arrangements worldwide. See, e.g., Allen
and Gale 1994. Hence, for example, two large lending institutions, one with its payments
receivable denominated in terms of ﬁxed interest rates and the other with receivables
denominated in terms of variable interest rates, might enter into a ‘‘swap’’ contract pursuant
to which each literally trades payment streams with the other for some term of time. They
will do so, presumably, because they differentially assess or value the risk attendant upon the
variable-denominated stream and the certainty attending the ﬁxed-denominated stream.
Options, warrants, futures, ‘‘swaptions,’’ and a host of other derivative contracts similarly
permit large market players to parcel out and trade classes of risk previously untradable. But
no such contracts, as yet, permit smaller players to diversify away the risks that they bear.
And the latter risks, when they eventuate, can be rather more devastating to their ‘‘smallplayer’’ bearers than are risks currently traded by large players. New data-gathering,
-accounting, and -parceling technologies, however, accompanied by the ‘‘globalization’’ of
the ﬁnancial markets, hold promise for smaller players. Thus, for example, derivative
securities whose values countervary with macroeconomic aggregates, which in turn vary with
individuals’ incomesFe.g., ‘‘GDP-consols,’’ ‘‘local real-estate collars,’’ and ‘‘average
occupational income collars’’Fwill enable individuals in effect to surrender some ‘‘upside’’
gains represented by rises above some stipulated average on the parts of aggregates with
which their incomes are positively correlated, in return for compensation of ‘‘downside’’
losses represented by drops below the stipulated average on the parts of aggregates with
which their incomes are positively correlated. Please see Hockett 2004c, 212–25.
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Now completeness and neutrality, in the senses just sketched, jointly
require equal treatment of all market participants in the product and
services (including labor) markets, in the investment/ﬁnancial markets,
and in the allocation of initial and continuing participation opportunity.
What is more, equal treatment in these three realms appears to sufﬁce to
afford completeness and neutrality in the senses elaborated to the fullest
extent practicable.
Begin with the necessity of equal treatment to the neutrality and
completeness of the products and services markets: If the class of
distribuees properly of concern to justice is the universe of all human
agents, then the mechanism that is fully to effect justice must reach all
human agents. All agents’ valuations of the goods and ills potentially
available to or threatening anyone, that is to say, which valuations are
carried outFin trading behaviorFrelative to holdings traceable to equal
endowments of all valuables and disvaluables, must enter into the
aggregated transactional, and hence the aggregated implicit valuational,
decisions that determine the uses, relative prices, and distributions of
those goods and ills among all human agents. But to treat actual or
would-be market participants unequallyFthat is, to prohibit their entry
into the markets altogether or to tax their participation differentially
according to their ethically irrelevant identities, attributes, or afﬁliations
rather than simply to allow the circulation of their offerings and their
desired goods and services to be determined by the distribution of wants
over the full universe of agentsFwould in effect be both to disequalize
their initial ethically exogenous endowments and partly to segment
(render incomplete) the market. It would therefore be to fall short of
both neutrality and completeness in the senses elaborated.
Let us turn next to the necessity of equal treatment, neutrality, and
completeness of the investment/ﬁnancial markets. The argument here is
structurally identical to that offered in connection with the products and
services markets. These markets are worth separate classiﬁcation and
consideration, however, for at least three reasons. First, these markets
currently are radicallyFand now unnecessarilyFless complete than are
the goods and (other) services markets.10 Second, they are the principal
realm in which what I have called ‘‘ills trading’’ (via risk trading), as
distinguished from ‘‘goods trading,’’ is effected; and both goods and ills
must be traded in order for justice to be effected via the mechanism that I
have sketched. And, third, the investment/ﬁnancial markets also are the
means by which we trade time-indexed goods and services with others, in
10

Please see the previous footnote.
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view of our differential valuations of goods and services according as they
are consumed or provided at different times. They can be viewed as
diachronic extensions of the synchronic goods and services markets, to
some extent bridging the justice mechanism across time and generations.
Turn ﬁnally to the participation-opportunity allocation. By this I mean
both the formal and the substantive capacity of every agent to participate
in the ‘‘neutral’’ and ‘‘complete’’ markets schematically described above.
Now an equal ‘‘formal’’ capacity to participate is, in essence, the legal
right to take part on equal terms with othersFthat is, a right not to be
excluded or taxed by dint of one’s ethically irrelevant identity, attributes,
or afﬁliations. Hence it already is guaranteed by the right to equal
treatment in the products, services, and investment/ﬁnancial markets.
The ‘‘substantive’’ capacity to participate, however, is, in essence, the
ethically exogenous endowment discussed previously. It is what each
participant ‘‘brings to the market’’ at any given time in anticipation of
participating. Market neutrality requires equal treatment with respect to
this allocation, then, quite trivially: ‘‘Neutrality’’ has been deﬁned, in part,
by reference to equality of this sort. (The ethical signiﬁcance and
compellingness of the deﬁnition was, I trust, sufﬁciently elaborated
above.)
But market completeness also, less trivially, requires equal treatment in
respect of the participation-opportunity allocation. Here the reasoning
again follows the lines of the reasoning offered in connection with the
products and services markets: Practical completeness requires that total
trading opportunityFthe total number of transactions in which one
might engageFbe maximized within the constraints imposed (a) by
others’ wishes to trade or not to trade, (b) by technology, and (c) by
the aggregate resource endowment. And that maximization is effected
only when every agent capable and desirous of trading is a participant in
the market on equal terms with everybody else.
Once it is established that each form of equal treatment is necessary to
affording market completeness and neutrality, establishing at least a
prima facie case that all three forms jointly sufﬁce to affording such
completeness and neutrality is straightforward. We simply note that
affording every agent equal formal and substantive capacity to transact
in the market and affect (that is, equally ‘‘vote’’ upon) the relative
valuations and distributions of all things that are adjudged good or ill,
and that are transferable, yields precisely that neutrality (traceability to
equal ethically exogenous endowments supplemented or deducted from
by ethically endogenous choices) and completeness (participation of all
potential participants, on equal terms) deﬁned aboveFthe fullest forms
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of neutrality and completeness apparently possible. What has been left
out? What practically satisﬁable additional requirement will yield a
greater or more satisfactory degree of neutrality or completeness?
Affording global equal treatment to all human persons, that is, all
responsible agents in the three realms noted, then, would appear to be
extensionally equivalent to affording that market completeness and
neutrality which jointly constitute the mechanism that is the most
compelling justice conception’s most straightforward embodiment.

3. Global Institutions, Best and ‘‘Second Best’’
3.1. I turn now to what it would be institutionally to guarantee (a) equal
treatment of all human agents and (b) practical market completeness in
the three realms just elaborated. Remarkably, there is one global institution in each realm that can be viewed ideally yet plausibly as charged with
guaranteeing, or at the very least furthering, equal treatment and market
completion of precisely the kinds just elaborated for that realm. Were
each fully to carry out its appointed or idealized task, it would provide a
reasonable approximation of the mechanism schematized above.
3.2. Begin with the products and services (including labor) markets,
where the case for the existence, already, of a global equal-treatment and
market-completion norm policed by one of the Bretton Woods institutions is most easily laid out. Global equal treatment in and completion of
these markets would entail, at a minimum, that goods and services trade
for one another at rates of exchange determined solely by the untrammeled trading activities of those who trade themFhence by the relative
valuations of the goods and services by agents implicit in the trades. What
would be prohibited by an equal-treatment and market-completing norm
in these markets would be any change to the relative exchange rates or
valuations of goods and services worked by an organized imposition of a
supply quota or surcharge, or by supply of a subsidy, to the availability,
purchase, or provision of the goods or services in question on the basis of
the ethically irrelevant (exogenous) identities, attributes, or afﬁliations of
the purchasers or sellers. Yet such a prohibition is, in effect, precisely
what is mandatedFas an end state to which the governments of the
world are expected gradually to move the global trading regimeFby the
GATT/WTO system.
Here is how: The GATT/WTO is commonly observed to operate via
four foundational legal commitments, or ‘‘pillars’’ (see, e.g., Bhala and
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Kennedy 1998, 59–115; Das 1999, 11–45, 55–72; Jackson 1999, 139–73,
213–28; Krueger 2000). The ﬁrst is the so-called unconditional mostfavored-nation obligation. This norm prohibits any signatory or member
from discriminating against or affording preferences to sellers of goods
(or eventually servicesFsee below) hailing from any other signatory or
member (other than itself) relative to sellers hailing from the other
signatories or members (see GATT Art. I; Bhala and Kennedy 1998,
60–78). The idea here is that citizens of all member states with whom
citizens of a given member state trade should be treated identically.
The second foundational GATT/WTO commitment is the so-called
national treatment obligation. This norm requires that all imports into a
member country be treated identically to domestically supplied products
(and eventually services, more on which, again, below) so far as ‘‘internal’’ taxes and regulations are concerned (see GATT Art. III; Bhala and
Kennedy 1998, 90–105). The idea here is that, once goods (or eventually
services) have entered a member country’s borders and all entry duties
(tariffs), if any, have been paid, those goods will circulate per the same
terms as goods supplied domestically.
The third foundational GATT/WTO commitment is the so-called
tariff-binding commitment. Pursuant to this obligation, member countries commit (a) to discriminate as between domestically supplied and
nondomestically supplied products (and eventually services) in at most
one wayFnamely, via the administration of customs duties (tariffs) laid
upon entry into the member country’s bordersFand (b) over time, via
negotiations among all member countries progressively to reduce those
duties ultimately to the vanishing point (see GATT Art. II; Bhala and
Kennedy 1998, 78–90). The idea here is to isolate unequal treatment by
member states as between their own and other member states’ citizens in
one, particularly transparent, form and ultimately to minimize, then
eliminate, that remaining form of unequal treatment itself.
The fourth foundational GATT/WTO commitment, rather like the
second, actually amounts to a tautologous complement of the third: The
so-called quantitative restrictions-elimination commitment (see GATT
Art. XI; Bhala and Kennedy 1998, 105–14) is designed to end immediatelyFrather than merely gradually to phase outFthe principal tariff
substitute employed by member states to favor their own or some other
members’ suppliers over others through the imposition of import quotas.
Now, the GATT/WTO system remains, in more ways than are
immediately apparent from the foregoing, incomplete and imperfect in
its effectuation of equal treatment and market completion in the global
products and services markets. There are numerous exceptions to the
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general rules that are the four foundational commitments related aboveF
most of them exceptions invokable only temporarily and under conditions
of acute domestic distress (so-called safeguard or Escape Clause provisionsFsee, e.g., GATT Art. XIX; Bhala and Kennedy 1998, 897–938),
some invokable on behalf of the citizens of particularly poor member
countries (see, e.g., GATT Arts. XVIII, XXXVI–XXXVIII; Bhala and
Kennedy 1998, 399–488; Jackson 1999, 319–37). And member countries
often prove quite clever, if in general only for brief periods, in evading
GATT norms by, for example, exploiting the general health, public
morals, and other exceptions to GATT obligations permitted under
GATT Art. XX (see Jackson 1999, 229–45), or by maintaining that
goods which consumers (our ‘‘distribuees’’) regard as substitutes nonetheless are not ‘‘like products’’ per GATT stipulation (see GATT Arts. II,
III, VI, IX, XIII, XVI, XIX; Das 1999, 18–20). There also are marketsF
notably those in services (including ﬁnancial services), intellectual property, telecommunications, trade-related investment measures, and government procurementFthat have only recentlyFagain, since 1994F
gradually come to be reached by GATT norms (see GATS; TRIMS;
TRIPS; Bhala and Kennedy 1998, 1241–333; Das 1999, 325–93; Jackson
1999, 305–17.) Finally, equal treatment in and completion of the labor
markets as suchFrather than via the goods and services marketsFis not
directly afforded by the GATT/WTO system at allFor, in any way
effectively, by that international institution speciﬁcally charged with
solicitude for labor, the International Labor Organization (ILO). (See,
e.g., Basu et al. 2003, 271–325; Elliott and Freeman 2003, 93–110).11
But the ideal toward which the system is moving, and moving both
more rapidly and effectively than ever before, should not be obscured by
the afore-noted imperfections. We are headed toward a world in which
there simply is no organized discrimination whatever among goods or
services on the basis of the identities of their suppliers. In that world,
suppliers of labor, tooFa form of serviceFwill be treated equally, at
least insofar as treatment in the investment/ﬁnancial markets and
participation-opportunity endowments (discussed below) are also equalized. And, in light of the link between equality and completeness highlighted above, it will be a world in which products, services, and labor
markets will be practically complete.
Now the rationale commonly proffered for the GATT/WTO
system appeals to the comparative-advantage exploitation, hence the
11
Rather remarkably, the most recent comprehensive treatise on international economic
law and institutionsFLowenfeld 2002Fdoes not even include so much as a citation of the
ILO, let alone a discussion of its efﬁcacy.
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specialization, scale economies, and aggregate productivity gains, offered
by global market integration. That rationale of course is fair enough in
the profferingFthe putative advantages would indeed tend to follow
upon integrationFinsofar as we legitimately can be concerned with
aggregate wealth apart from its distribution.12 But what is seldom noted
is that there is a muchFindeed, inﬁnitelyFmore ethically compelling,
justice-grounded rationale for the equal treatment and ultimate marketcompletion norms promoted by the GATT/WTO system, at least when
that system is complemented by the next two Bretton Woods subregimes
that I shall discuss: It is that equal treatment in the products and services
markets is necessary to effect that market completion and neutrality
requisite to a just distribution of what responsible agents regard as
beneﬁts and burdens; and that, in conjunction with its two complements
to which I next turn attention, it will sufﬁce to effect that just distribution.
3.3. Turn now to the investment/ﬁnancial markets. Here the case for
equal treatment and market completion as jointly constitutive of a
Bretton Woods institution’sFin this case, the IMF’sFraison d’être is
only slightly more complicated in the making than was the case made in
connection with the GATT/WTO. It is somewhat more complicated
essentially because the Fund exists for rather more than equal-treatment
and market-completion purposes.13
Let us consider the more transparently egalitarian aspects of the Fund’s
mandate.
First, as in the case of the products and services markets, global equal
treatment and market completion in the investment/ﬁnancial markets
would require at a minimum (a) the elimination, in connection with
ﬁnancial ﬂows, of obstacles predicated upon the ethically irrelevant
(‘‘exogenous’’) identities, attributes, or afﬁliations of the originators or
recipients of such ﬂows, rather as in the case of the GATT/WTO’s
‘‘foundational commitments’’ in the products and services markets; and,
perhaps more ambitiously, (b) the active facilitation of both (i) new
12
Such concern is, of course, problematic, if not indeed ethically unintelligible. See, e.g.,
Dworkin 1980; Hockett 2004b.
13
It is, for example, viewed both by its leading living legal commentator and by its most
distinguished historian as above all else a forum for ongoing monetary cooperation between
national authorities, the latter thought important owing to the dangers posed by global
monetary instability (see Edwards 1985, 569, 655–57; James 1996, 586). However, this
function itself can be viewed as providing a form of progressively ﬁnanced global social
insurance, the ‘‘premia’’ for whichFin the form of member-country subscriptionsFrise as
the payer’s wealth rises (see Fund Art. I (i); I (iii); I (v); I (vi); III, Schedule A (Quotas);
Edwards 1985, 12–17, 167–298).
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ﬁnancial markets in new forms of investment and risk trading and (ii)
broader participation both in such new markets and in established
ﬁnancial markets.
Now note that precisely these desiderata are among the principal
projects with which the Fund is engaged. Begin with the ‘‘constitutionally’’ easiest limbFthe elimination of obstacles. The Fund’s constitutive
Articles of Agreement expressly prohibit member countries from slowing
cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows in one principal, ‘‘time-honored’’ manner in
which such slowings have typically been imposedFnamely, via discriminatory currency (exchange-rate) practices (see Fund Art. VIII, 3; Edwards 1985, 380–422). (It should be noted that this equal-treatment norm
also complements those norms mandated by the GATT/WTO: One
means, beyond tariffs and quotas, by which national governments
traditionally have favored their own sellers is by manipulating the rates
at which their currencies trade with other nations’ currencies.)
The Fund also, in a rather more nuanced way, operates to lessen or
eliminate member countries’ slowings of capital ﬂows in the other
principal, ‘‘time-honored’’ manner commonly employed in the pastF
namely, via the imposition of capital-transfer controls.14 The Fund’s
Articles of Agreement tend to be ‘‘dynamically’’ and ‘‘teleologically’’
interpreted (see Hockett 2002, 178–80). And while capital controls were
seen among the institution’s 1944 foundersFKeynes in particularFas at
that time necessary evils, the prevailing norm since the 1980s has been to
view the necessity as having receded, and the evil now strictly to be
avoided (idem; also Edwards 1985, 449–90). So the Fund tends, in its
consultative, ‘‘surveillance,’’ and conditional lending capacities strongly
and effectively to discourage the imposition of capital controls (see Fund
Arts. IV, 3; V, 3; Hockett 2002, 180–89; Hockett 2004b). The upshot is
that there truly does appear now to be quite nearly one, integrated global
ﬁnancial market (see Hockett 2002, 170–77). That’s one step in the
direction of ‘‘completeness,’’ via the imposition of an equal-treatment
norm.
The next steps in the direction of ‘‘completeness’’ are recent and thus
far tentative. First, commencing with the breakup of the Soviet bloc in the
later 1980s, the Fund began to offer support to former bloc members in
the development of market-facilitative and market-expansive legal norms
and institutions (Hockett 2002, 154–57). Second, in the wake of the
‘‘Asian Financial Crisis’’ (AFC), the Fund turned to the offering of expert
14
Fund operations here are ‘‘more nuanced’’ in the following sense: On the one hand,
the Fund’s Articles expressly permit such controls (see Fund Art. VI, 3). On the other hand,
the Fund exists in part to eliminate the need of, or the temptation to employ, such controls.
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support in the way of bankruptcy law, corporate governance, and
ﬁnancial regulation to actually and potentially affected member countries
(idem). Finally, the Fund has recently begun to show interest in proposals
for the creation of new markets in new forms of contingent-claims
contract (see Hockett 2004b).
All of these activities are geared toward broadening, hence rendering
more complete, investment and ﬁnancial markets (indeed, in the case of
the former Soviet-bloc countries, product and services markets as well).
The case is clearest in the post-AFC period: The interest in bankruptcy
law, corporate governance, and ﬁnancial regulation is prompted by an
interest in promoting the broadest possible participation in the markets
for ownership of and lending to value-productive ﬁrms (see Hockett 2002,
154–57, 174–77). Note also that the principal Fund corporate-governance
interestFinsider tradingFis eo ipso an interest in equal access to
information pertinent to securities prices. The interest in new risk markets
is, of course, by deﬁnition an interest in the greater completion of what I
have above called the ‘‘ills market’’Fa critical piece of the justice
mechanism.
The upshot of the fuller argument is, I believe, threefold: The Fund
began with a mission to complement the equal-treatment and marketcompletion missions of the GATT/WTO in the products (and later
services) markets, essentially by facilitating, and to a half-degree requiring, equal treatment and market enhancement in the ﬁnancial markets.
Over time, the Fund grew more robust and more comprehensive in its
treatment-equalizing and market-expanding roles vis-à-vis the global
investment and ﬁnancial markets, as those markets themselves grew
markedly in extent (and partly, indeed, in response) (Hockett 2002,
154–57, 174–77). And the Fund both may and ought to continue its
developmentFagain in keeping with its properly viewed mandateF
along these lines. Such is the best understanding of what the Fund is
for (see Hockett 2004b).
3.4. Turn ﬁnally to the global preparticipation opportunity allocation.
Here the case for full equal treatment and ultimate market completion as
constitutive of a Bretton Woods institution’sFnow the Bank’sFfundamental mandate is most difﬁcult to make, in part because the Bank falls
so far short of realizing any such ideal. I shall argue, nonetheless, that
(perhaps gradual) realization of such an ideal is precisely what the Bank
should be viewed as existing for; and that its falling short of that goal
owes quite simply, to injustice on the part of certain inﬂuential state
actors upon the Bank’s founding and, indeed, ever since.
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Consider ﬁrst what would be required by equal treatment in the global
preparticipation opportunity allocation. I take it that what would be
ideally required is, at a minimum, precisely that ‘‘ethically exogenous
endowment equality’’ discussed above. All personsFall human agents,
who are justice’s proper distribueesFwould begin life with an equal claim
upon the world’s ethically exogenous resources and risk-trading opportunities, and all would retain an equal claim upon all new such resources
and opportunities as might become available over time. The basic idea
would be to ensure market neutrality and completion in the fullest
practicable sense by ensuring that all persons enter the iterated market
at any given time with equal ethically exogenous capacity to effect the
ongoing relative social (now global) valuation and disposition of agentadjudged beneﬁts and burdens.
Now the Bank, on the one hand, cannot be said to have been instituted
with so fulsome an egalitarian mission clearly in view. It was, after all,
originally envisaged as an institution charged simply with facilitating the
reconstruction of war-ravaged European infrastructures (Hockett 2002,
162–64). And it remains to this day a lending institution, charged with
assisting member countries in the borrowing, not the outright acquiring,
of funds to improve the capacities of their citizens to participate in
the global economy (see Bank Art. I; Edwards 1985, 44–48). On the
other hand, the Bank’s very existence as an institution apart from the
Fund is predicated upon the need for a publicly funded (via large-country
subscriptions) supplement toFin the form either of facilitator of or
guarantor toFlending markets insufﬁciently peopled by private parties
willing to lend absent such supplementation (see, e.g., Kaul et al. 1998,
2000.) And the Bank’s mission, like that of the Fund, has evolved
since its inceptionFin the direction of greater compensation to the
world’s poor (or at least those who do not inhabit aggregately wealthy
nation-states).
The evolution of the Bank into a more forthrightly compensatory
institution has proceeded along two principal fronts. First, with the
implementation of the U.S. Marshall Plan in the later 1940s and the
rapid recovery of the European economies through the 1950s, the Bank’s
constituency came increasingly to be viewed as the more intractably
‘‘underdeveloped countries’’ (see, e.g., Pincus and Winters 2002, 1–15).
This change can be seen in the Bank’s recent shift of focus from
traditional project investment in ‘‘big,’’ material infrastructural projectsF
dams, roads, hydroelectric plants, and the likeFto so-called humancapital investment projectsFeducation, health care, population control,
and so on (see, e.g., Fine 2002, 203–21; Lowenfeld 2002, 618).
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Further, since 1960 the World Bank Group has included a subsidiary
organizationFthe International Development Association (IDA)Fspeciﬁcally charged with the task of affording so-called soft loans to
particularly impoverished nations. The loans are labeled ‘‘soft’’ in view
of their long repayment terms (often up to ﬁfty years) and low rates of
interest (often as low as .75% per annum) (Lowenfeld 2002, 620). Unlike
the IBRD proper, moreover, the IDA is ﬁnanced by the revenues that
IBRD investments throw off and by actual cash contributionsFcheerfully termed ‘‘replenishments’’Fmade by wealthier industrial countries
every three years in proportion to their Bank subscriptions and voting
power (idem). In that sense, the IDA is of course ‘‘progressively’’
ﬁnanced. The ideal pursuant to which the Bank appears to be operating,
then, is one according to which, at minimum, the least advantaged (in
aggregately poor nation-states) are deserving of special solicitude.
3.5. Now it is clear that it is the Bank which is furthestFboth in written
mandate and, less fully, in its actual operationsFfrom what I have
argued would best be viewed as its actuating ideal. And it is not terribly
mysterious why that should be: The mission that I have allotted to the
BankFequalization of the global preparticipation opportunity allocationFis that mission which would require that those persons holding
unjustiﬁably large aggregations of ethically exogenous wealth compensate
those holding unjustiﬁably meager portions of such wealth. And those
persons who hold the unjustiﬁably large aggregations, of course, tend to
populate and determine the active policies of the wealthiest, best armed,
most inﬂuential state actors in the global polity. These states in turn
largely constrain the design and conduct of international institutions.
Quite simply, then, the principal beneﬁciaries of past and continuing
injustice prevent the adoption of the principal measures that must yet be
taken. What, then, is to be done?
I shall now propose two directions of policy and advocacy that I think
all of those concerned with global justice ought to take.
3.6. First, we ought certainly to focus our attentions, and probably to
concentrate our advocacy efforts, more with a view to the failure of the
Bank to live up to its ideal mission than to the successes of the GATT/
WTO and IMF in discharging their appointed missions. Speciﬁcally, we
should push for the Bank to be empowered, presumably incrementally
and ﬁrst via the IDA, overtly to effect a gradual corrective channeling of
ethically exogenous wealth, for the purpose of developing human marketparticipating capabilities, from those accidentally bearing greater access
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to the world’s ethically exogenous stock of resources to those accidentally
bearing less such access. An excellent start in this direction would be to
advocate, for example, that the Bank be authorized to administer the
collection and distribution of a Poggian global-resources dividend or its
functional equivalent (see, e.g., Pogge 1994). One would hope, however,
to see such an effort only begin ‘‘moderately’’ in the manner that Pogge
suggests (1994, 204–08.) Over time, as it and its rationale grow more
familiar, the effort should grow more ambitious. And its beneﬁciaries, of
course, should be soughtFas certainly they will be foundFnot merely in
the aggregately ‘‘underdeveloped’’ countries but in all countries.
While at ﬁrst, of course, such advocacy can be expected to be met with
the familiar Reaganesque charge of ‘‘handouts to the Cadillac-driving
[now global] welfare queens’’ from the unjustly overendowed, our
expressly and speciﬁcally tying all proposals to the market-preparing
and market-facilitating rationale offered aboveFand, thus, to the responsibility-tracing while exogenous opportunity-equalizing conception of
justice offered aboveFshould signiﬁcantly undercut, if not indeed obliterate, the persuasiveness of such rhetorical stratagems. Those concerned with justice will be enabled to claim in response to the unjust, quite
plausibly, ‘‘We simply call for a fuller, more extensiveFmore complete as
well as more fairFglobal market even than you do. Why do you stand in
the way of this extensive market? Why do you refuse to honor responsibility and equal opportunity worldwide?’’
The reasons militating in favor of this ﬁrst policy direction, I think, are
plain: Attacks upon the GATT/WTO and the IMF, or upon global trade
or global investment as such, are misdirected. Worse, they siphon off
valuable advocative resources while offering little if any hope of any
signiﬁcant beneﬁt. Keeping the ‘‘real’’ problemFthat the Bank lacks the
resources to fulﬁll its proper mandateFclearly in view is absolutely
critical even if, for strategic reasons, we nonetheless decide to call for
some restrictionsFin the form of conditionsFupon the operations of the
GATT/WTO and the IMF.
3.7. The second policy direction that critics of the Bretton Woods
system and others concerned with global justice ought to take is
strategically, and with a clear view of the end state ultimately sought,
to impose a sort of ‘‘conditionality’’ of their own in assenting to the
operations of the GATT/WTO and the IMF. (A ﬁttingly ironical
demand!) It should be arguedFwith sophistication, not just slogansFthat ‘‘free trade’’ and ‘‘free ﬁnance’’ are to be tolerated and indeed
to be sought, but only insofar as they promote (or at any rate do not
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retard) justice. And it should be explicitly acknowledged that they can
indeed promote full justice if and insofar as actual and would-be
participants in the global goods-trading and ﬁnancial markets gradually
are rendered equally ‘‘free,’’ that is, equally ethically exogenously endowed throughout their lives.
Insofar as such would-be global market participants are not equally
free in the requisite senseFthat is, insofar as the Bank is not empowered
to effect the mission here envisaged for itFthe global polity in general,
and those concerned with global justice in particular, must address a
thorny ‘‘problem of the second best’’ in evaluating the operations of
GATT/WTO and IMF regimes and in determining what precisely to
advocate. This problem cannot be dispatched by sloganeering. The
critical questions, which must be carefully addressed, become (a) to
what extent (if any) does a partial, rather than a full, movement in the
direction of ﬁlling justice’s earlier-elaborated requisites result in some
actual justice improvement in the distribution of beneﬁts and burdens and
(b) if the answer to the ﬁrst question is ‘‘not at all,’’ ‘‘it’s ambiguous,’’ ‘‘it’s
indeterminate,’’ or, worse, ‘‘it actually worsens things,’’ what is to be
done? Those two questions are difﬁcult to answer absent some speciﬁc
description of the particular ‘‘partial’’ movement in the direction of ﬁlling
justice’s requisites that is contemplated. But it happens that we do have a
fairly speciﬁc, if necessarily rough, description of the requisite sort
available to us. And it looks as though we can fairly make some general
observations of the distributive outcomes that tend to be wrought in the
world so described. We can also, only somewhat more tentatively, fashion
recommendations in light of those likely outcomes. So we have at least
some rough, schematic answers to questions (a) and (b) as just formulatedFanswers that can be ﬂeshed out with further empirical, including
econometric, work to be prescribed below.
3.7.1. First, note a familiarly observed effect likely to be wrought by
equal treatment and market completion in the products and services
markets absent equal treatment in the preparticipation opportunity
allocationFthat is, by success on the part of the GATT/WTO system
absent success on the part of the Bank Group as I have idealized it: At
time T2, persons in some jurisdictionsFfor example, laborers in relatively
wealthy countriesFare unjustly underendowed but are less so than were
many of their occupational (and, indeed, generally biologic) forebears at
T0. They are less unjustly underendowed than the aforementioned
forebears in consequence of certain institutionalized justice concessions
that intervening forebears during period T1 were able to extract, in the
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forms of governmentally sanctioned collective bargaining and progressive
taxation-ﬁnanced social-insurance regimes, from earlier persons, such as
holders of large landed estates or large equity stakes in productive
enterprisesFgenerally, indeed, the biologic forebears of our present
holders of large land and equity sharesFwho were unjustly overendowed. Now at T3, owing to the success of a global effort to equalize
treatment and effect greater market completion in the products and
services marketsFan effort that has not as yet been matched by any
global effort, analogous to earlier domestic efforts, to compensate for
unjustly unequal endowmentsFthese relatively better endowed but still
unjustly underendowed persons ﬁnd themselves ‘‘backsliding’’ in the
direction of unjustly yet further underendowed status once again, as
others who are unjustly even more underendowed than they areFgenerally the poor in lesser developed countriesFsuddenly are enabled to
compete with them in selling, yet more cheaply, what laborFthe underendowed’s only legally protected assetFthey can offer.
The backsliders, quite naturally, complain. They see, in effect, a rolling
back of the underendowment-compensation provisions that their forebears were able to effect at T1. The unjustly overendowed, for their part,
predictably now posture as if they were ethically or progress minded,
censoriously intoning (a) that the backsliders are unconcerned for the
global poor struggling valiantly to work their way out of poverty, (b) that
the backsliders stand in the way of progressive specialization and the
consequent realization of fabulous economies of scale and ultimate
aggregate growth that ‘‘beneﬁts everybody,’’ or both. That, of course,
amounts to a ‘‘divide and conquer [the unjustly underendowed]’’ political-economic and rhetorical strategy taken by the unjustly overendowed, effected by means of a surprisingly successful, since not all that
clever, sleight of hand: Attention is cynically diverted from the injustice of
the endowment distribution as between the over- and the underendowed
generally, to a putatively self-serving, productivity-antagonistic, uncharitable grousing on the part of the less underendowed over the marvelous
opportunities now being extended to consumers as a class and the more
desperately underendowed as potential producers. Any effort to redirect
attention to where it belongs is, again cynicallyFand now quite ironicallyFmet with the pejorative charge of ‘‘class warfare.’’ (As if the
protest, rather than the expropriation, were the ‘‘war.’’)
The backsliders and their supporters, regrettably, have in many cases
fallen into the trap to which the aforementioned strategy amounts. They
have protested often without proposing an end state, effectively lending
credence to the aggregationist and ad hominem attacks of free-trade
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apologists. Their answers to those attacks, in turn, when offered at all,
often take the form, more or less, of a claim that ‘‘trade should be free,
but it also should be fair.’’ That proposition is, of course, fair enough. But
what would count as ‘‘fair’’ too often is left obscure.
The obscurity appears to be a result of several factors. First, no
comprehensive conception of justice like that offered above is borne in
mind. Second, attention consequently is not ﬁxed so much upon the
distribution between the unjustly overendowed and (all of) the unjustly
underendowed as upon that between the unjustly underendowed and the
unjustly yet more underendowed. And, third, as between two classes, each
of which is unjustly treated but one of which is yet more unjustly treated
than the other, it is not clear what distribution justice, even were one
possessed of a justice conception, could requireFparticularly when,
as a practical matter, effectively treating the two classes jointly as
exhausting the universe of appropriate distribuees diverts attention
from another class of persons who owe both of the unjustly treated
classes compensation.
In light of the discussion in part 2, however, it now should be clear what
global fairness would ideally entail, and what those concerned for both
the backsliders and the unjustly yet more underendowed should bear in
mind as a benchmark: Calculate at least the rough value of the aggregate
global ethically exogenous endowmentFsomething like Steiner’s ‘‘global
fund’’ (Steiner 1998, 99–100; 1994, 270–80)Fand at least roughly
determine, on the basis of the global population, each person’s rightful
share. Then calculate some functional equivalent of an ideal global
taxation and redistribution schedule that would determine appropriate
transfers from those possessed of more than their shares to those
possessed of less. In light of statistically well-documented disparities in
wealth within domestic economies and worldwideFsmall numbers with
huge aggregations, vast numbers with very littleFchances are (a) that
those schedules would recommend transfers directly from the ﬁnancialcapital-owning overendowed to both the backsliders and the currently yet
more underendowed; and (b) that the backsliders, were they to act
collectivelyFand particularly were they to cooperate with the yet more
desperateFcould successfully condition agreement to untrammeled trade
upon some degree of conformity on the part of the overendowed to the
schedules, or upon acceptance of some set of conditions that would
amount to the functional equivalent of such a degree of conformity.
(Were the form that compensation takes to include some manner of
subsidized, market-facilitative ‘‘human-capital’’ development, [b] would
be even more likely.) If that hypothesis is borne out, the question then
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becomes, in justice, should the backsliders so condition their assent to
untrammeled trade? I believe that they should. Here is why, and more
precisely how.
First, there would be a practical inﬁnity of sets of conditions that
would, if properly tailored, amount in their impositions to the imposition
of rough ‘‘functional equivalents’’ of the ideal taxation and redistribution
schedules in the aforementioned sense. One, for example, would be simply
to condition the extension of the GATT/WTO most-favored-nation
principle to any nation upon that nation’s extending more or less the
same compensatory collective bargaining and/or redistributive taxation
beneﬁts to its citizens as the backsliders’ nations historically have done to
them.15 Another would be simply to calculate the additional proﬁts
gleaned by the overendowed in any given nation by dint of their
effectively hiring cheaper, extranational labor, then guarantee that
some appropriate portion of those proﬁts be directed to consequently
‘‘backsliding’’ intranational labor, perhaps partly in the form of guaranteed ‘‘human-capital’’-development rights. Still another rough functional
equivalent would be to require that all persons disemployed or rendered
less employed by ﬁrms in consequence of expanded global competition in
the labor markets be compensated with dividend-yielding ownership
shares in the ﬁrms that employ such cheaper laborers as do not avail
themselves of collective-bargaining rightsFa form of ﬁnancial capitaldevelopment right extended to the backsliders (see Hockett 2005).
Second, note that any of these rough ‘‘functional equivalents’’ can be
calibrated, such that gains realized through the hiring of desperate labor
go not entirely to the less desperate labor but partly to the overendowed
as well. Allowance for some portion of the latter sort presumably would
afford continued incentives to the overendowed to continue to hireFand
presumptively to beneﬁtFthe desperately poor, even while compensating
the less desperately poor sufﬁciently to prevent or substantially slow their
backsliding. Why this manner of ‘‘incentivization’’ of the overendowed
might be desirable is considered next.
Third, note that the historical tendency is for the desperately poor, as
they are increasingly drawn into the industrial economy, to organize
themselves and demand more in the way of compensation, at accelerating
rates, from the unjustly overendowed (see, e.g., Beaud 2001, 144–50;
Bernstein 2004, 333–34). A long-to-medium-term effect, then, of continued integration of the global labor market, provided that the no longer
15
The taxation beneﬁts might be preferable, insofarFthough only insofarFas the most
underendowed among the divided and conquered might, as a practical matter, actually
refrain from taking recourse to the collective-bargaining rights.
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desperate are not thrown back into debilitating desperation, would
appear likely to be a more consolidated effort on the part of the unjustly
underendowed as a whole more effectually to bring about a gradual
corrective global exogenous endowment redistribution from the unjustly
overendowed.
Fourth, note again, as observed earlier, that it appears to be inherently
problematic, if not indeed theoretically indeterminate, how we ought to
regard the comparative distributions of two differentially unjustly underendowed classes alone, with no view to the remainder of the universe of
distribueesFthe unjustly overendowed. This problem becomes particularly acute when the effort so to evaluate those distributions is apt to
distract, as a practical matter, the would-be evaluator from attending to
the unjustly overendowed class’s endowment in a manner reasonably
likely to entail redistributions of their endowment that would result
unambiguously, because completely as regards the universe of distribuees,
in an improvement in justice.
Fifth, in light of the fourth observation, it is not only the case that the
‘‘prize’’ upon which we should train our eyes is the overage held by the
unjustly overendowed. It is also the case that (at least) marginal
differences in such portions of an aggregate gain wrought by global
market integration as would go to an unjustly underendowed class and an
unjustly yet more underendowed class ought not to concern us overmuch.
The unjustly underendowed might reasonably even tolerate a minimal
degree of ‘‘backsliding’’ but certainly could reasonably tolerate a somewhat slowed rate of forward movement in the short term, if there were
good reason to suppose that both classes will be enabled to move forward
together in the direction of receipt of full compensation from the unjustly
overendowed fairly quickly in consequence of the toleration. (I appeal
here to the third point raised above.)
I conclude, in light of these ﬁve observations, that advocates of global
justice ought to condition assent to free trade upon ‘‘fair’’ trade inFand
possibly only inFsomething like the sense elaborated above. They should
require that a sizable share of such aggregate gains generated by the
GATT/WTO regime as currently accrue to the unjustly overendowed be
diverted to the ‘‘backsliders.’’ But probably they should not demand so
large a share as would remove the incentive of the unjustly overendowed
to employ the currently unjustly yet more underendowed in the ﬁrst
instance. (Note that the dividend-yielding stock option proposed above
would afford the backsliders themselves incentives in effect to do the
desired hiringFthrough the management of the ﬁrms that they come
partly to own, of course.)
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This strategy can be summarized, I think, in the following maxim:
Raise the condition of the most unjustly done by, in order to swell the
ranks of the politically more inﬂuential next-most unjustly done by. Do so
by capturing most of the aggregate gains wrought by free global trade and
channeling them largely or principally to the most unjustly done by. But
channel enough to the next-most unjustly done by to prevent their sinking
back into desperation themselves, and allow enough to go to the unjustly
prospering to ‘‘incentivize’’ their continuing to raise the material living
standards (and thus eventual political inﬂuence) of the most unjustly done
by. Condition assent to the GATT/WTO regime upon this distribution of
the gains, since the unjustly prospering will be ‘‘incentivized’’ to accept the
condition, and their accepting it will result, in the not-so-distant future, in
sufﬁcient strengthening of the unjustly done by as a whole to maximize
the prospect ultimately of full compensation afforded them allFthat is,
of ongoing full justice’s being institutionalized, for example, via the aforeenvisaged strengthening of the Bank.
Framing the advice in this manner reduces our problem of the second
best to a manner of at least theoretically tractable ‘‘accounting’’ problem.
It becomes a matter of tracing the ﬂows of beneﬁts wrought by successful
implementation of the GATT/WTO regime, calculating their amounts
and rates of growth and estimating their effects upon the incentives of the
unjustly overendowed. I have been assuming, of course, that implementation of the GATT/WTO regime does in fact result in sufﬁcient aggregate
gain to permit the channeling of beneﬁts in signiﬁcant measure in all three
of the directions that I have advocated. The realism of that assumption,
as well as of the assumption that there are institutional means of imposing
and fulﬁlling the conditions, of course must be examined empirically and
in adequate detail.
3.7.2. The second general tendency likely to be wrought in a world
shorn of any institution discharging the Bank’s ideal function stems from
the operations of the Fund, rather as the ﬁrst such tendency stems from
those of the GATT/WTO. Here the normative limb of the second-best
analysis is somewhat more simply mapped than it was in the previous
section.
Consider a class of unjustly underendowed persons, distributed
throughout the world but found disproportionately in aggregately poorer
nations lacking both in the ﬁnance-regulatory infrastructures and in the
social insurance ‘‘safety nets’’ commonly found in most of the wealthier
nations. This class of distribuees, precisely because its members are
underendowed, comprises persons who are less able to diversify their
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assets and bear risks to their livelihoods than are better-endowed persons.
These very same people, as a class, also tend to be more frequently subject,
as a matter of actual occurrence, to those forms of economic volatility
that place their livelihoodsFwhich tend to accrue solely to their principal
if not their only asset, their laborFat risk. For those forms of volatility
are, above all else, ﬁnancial in origin. They are consequent both upon the
free mobility of investment capital, during market panic, out of the ﬁrms
that employ the underendowed persons and upon the lack of such
adequate ﬁnance- and ﬁrm-regulatory architectures as tend to inspire
sufﬁcient global investor conﬁdence as is required to induce investors to
leave their investments stably in place for uninterrupted durations.
Moreover, the same instrumentality that has most authoritatively presided over the freeing of global ﬁnancial ﬂows as just describedFthe
IMFFcommonly counsels, and indeed often requires via its conditional
lending, that affected nations both (a) scale back on whatever social
insurance programs they have and (b) adopt restrictive, hence employment discouraging, monetary and ﬁscal policies more generally as a
means of strengthening global investors’ conﬁdence in the prospects
presented by investment in those countries. This of course tends, at least
in the short term, to worsen the prospects of the disemployed destitute yet
further.
On the other hand, these vulnerabilities in large measure constitute, in
effect, the ﬂipside of a free-ﬁnance-wrought ‘‘advantage’’ which our most
underendowed persons have lately enjoyed relative to certain somewhat
less underendowed persons more commonly found in wealthier nations:
They have, precisely because less endowed, been attracting investment
and consequent employment by the unjustly overendowed, as described
above in connection with the success of the GATT/WTO regime in
discharging its function. And the freeing of ﬁnancial ﬂows effected by the
IMF regime has, of course, been instrumental in bringing this ‘‘advantage’’ to the unjustly desperate. The unjustly overendowed thus taketh
away, so to speak, but they do so in considerable measure by the same
means through which they givethFthe means of untrammeled global
ﬁnance and investment.
The consequences for our normative second-best analysis of the free
global ﬁnance and investment regime are twofold. First, with respect to
the unjustly most underendowed, the justicial effects of the IMF’s
successful operations absent similar success on the part of the Bank in
discharging its own ideal function as laid out above are ambiguous. The
success results simultaneously in affording (at least a modicum of ) greater
opportunity to these distribuees, while also subjecting them to greater
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risk. It is not immediately clear, then, what precisely to propose by way of
advocacy, at least in the form of an ‘‘all-or-nothing’’ admonition. One is
tempted, ﬁrst, to allow those who are simultaneously beneﬁciaries and
victims of the regime to decide for themselves how comparatively to
weigh the risks and rewards that it affords and thus whether they wish to
continue with it or to terminate it. But one also is tempted, second, to seek
means of retaining the beneﬁts while lessening or mitigating the risks
posed by continuation of the system, and perhaps to condition continuation in turn upon acceptance of such risk-reducing, mitigating measures.
As it happens, much useful thinking and advocatingFby justice
advocates and regulators alikeFhave begun to yield salutary results
along the lines of that second ‘‘temptation.’’ The IMF itself has begun
both recommending, and assisting in the effectuation of, more effective
market-facilitative ﬁnance-regulatory programs in less developed constituency nations since the time of the Asian Financial Crisis. By protecting
investors and inspiring investor conﬁdence, these programs can reasonably be expected in the long run to lessen ﬁnancial volatility. Further, the
IMF (along with the Bank) also has begun, in response to vigorous
criticisms raised since the AFC and especially since the Argentine meltdown in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, to recognize (or perhaps rediscover) the importanceFfor political and, indeed, economic stability if
not forthrightly for reasons of justiceFof effective social-insurance
programs (see, e.g., Hockett 2004b; Fox 2003; Subbarao 2003). Finally,
many inﬂuential (and not in all cases unorthodox) ﬁnancial economists,
and now policy makers as well, have begun to recognize the potential
beneﬁts of collectively imposing some degree of friction, in the form of
transaction excises (‘‘Tobin taxes’’), upon ﬁnancial ﬂows themselves (see,
e.g., ul Haq et al. 1996).
I provisionally conclude, then, that, at least so far as the worst off in the
developing countries are concerned, advocacy along many lines already
familiar has been successful and both ought to and will continue. There is
not a strong justicial reason, then, so far as this constituency of
distribuees is concerned, to condition continued tolerance of the IMF
regime tout court upon a movement of the Bank more rapidly toward
fulﬁllment of the ideal mission that I have designated for itFunless, of
course, as an empirical matter it can be shown that imposing such a
condition would render such movement of the Bank substantially more
likely or more rapid, in which case there would of course be plausible
strategic reasons fundamentally to change the discourse on the IMF.
The second consequence of the above-discussed IMF and free-ﬁnance
empirics for our normative second-best analysis is a bit less cheery than
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that just laid out. But it also has, in effect, been laid out already: Recall
that, in connection with the second-best discussion of the GATT/WTO’s
effects above in section 3.7.1, we observed that while the worst off among
the unjustly done by appear, even notwithstanding the Bank’s falling
short of its ideal mission, to be rendered arguably better off, under the
same circumstances the somewhat less badly off among the unjustly done
byFthe backslidersFtend to fare worse. Now this faring worse is not
simply wrought by the success of the GATT/WTO regime. It is critically
facilitated by the operation of the IMF regime, by dint of the critical
linkages between the trade and investment regimes adumbrated above.
The second-best question here accordingly becomes, Should the analysis
offered above, from which we concluded that continued toleration of the
GATT/WTO system ought to be conditioned, carry over to the IMF
context?
Perhaps counterintuitively, I don’t believe that there is an easy answer
here. And I suspect that even a sensitive empirical assessment of likely
tendencies is unlikely to prove capable of being sensitive enough to offer
much help. Here, in essence, is why: In favor of conditionality here would
be all of the arguments in favor of conditionality with respect to
continued toleration of the GATT/WTO’s operations, above. Against
conditionality, on the other hand, might be the fact that conditionality in
respect of the GATT/WTO system might well sufﬁce to accomplish the
stated end, while allowing the IMF system to chug ahead with the aforenoted reforms gradually being taken on will facilitate both a continued
Fand presumably now more continuousFlifting up of the living
standards of the worst off and the continued development of a rapidly
crystallizing global ﬁnance-regulatory governance system, which beneﬁts
everybody.
I provisionally conclude, then, that justice advocates ought deﬁnitely to
pursue the conditions-imposing advocative posture recommended above
in connection with the GATT/WTO regime, and perhapsFbut only
perhapsFought to extend that posture to their treatment of the Bretton
Woods system as a whole. They should ﬁrst call forcefully for an enabling
of the Bank as described above. They should, further, condition their
continued acceptance of the GATT/WTO regime until the Bank is so
empowered, in the manner described above. And they should, moreover,
condition acceptance of the IMF regime upon continued progress of the
sort observed above being under way (regulatory improvement, socialinsurance acceptance, transaction taxation, and so forth). But they should
table, for the moment, the question of whether also to condition
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gate-gain-apportionment system analogous to that required in connection
with the GATT/WTO.
4. Conclusion
I have sketched what I take to be a metatheoretically and practically
compelling theoretic and institutional ideal toward which those interested
in global justice might coherently and realistically strive, as well as a
plausible menu of advocative strategies, sensitive to institutional and
power-distributional ‘‘facts on the ground,’’ from which the same persons
might choose in pressing ahead. There are of course many junctures along
the argumentative path that I have followed at which I might be taken to
task, and which therefore I should have to buttress more fully in a more
complete argument. It nonetheless strikes me as both remarkable and
encouraging that we have before us three institutions that stand so close,
in theory and, indeed, in mandate, jointly to constituting a workable
infrastructure of global justice. We stand so near toFand yet, until we get
there, so agonizingly far fromFwhere we now must go.
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Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientiﬁque 11:81–120.
Allen, Franklin, and Douglas Gale. 1994. Financial Innovation and Risk
Sharing. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Arneson, Richard. 1989. ‘‘Equality of Opportunity for Welfare.’’ Philosophical Studies 56:77–93.
FFF. 1990. ‘‘Primary Goods Reconsidered.’’ NOÛS 24:429–54.
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